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 The social costs of monopoly and regulation:
 a game-theoretic analysis
 William P. Rogerson*
 The theory of rent-seeking is that monopoly profits attract resources directed into efforts
 to obtain these profits and that the opportunity costs of these resources are a social cost
 of monopoly. This article shows that monopoly rents remain untransformed to the extent
 thatfirms are inframarginal in the competition for them and thereby earn profits. Different
 fixed organization costs can produce infrarnarginalfirms. In a situation where a monopoly
 franchise is periodically reassigned, the inculmbent may possess an advantage in the next
 year's hearings. This also restults in untransformed rents.
 1. Introduction
 * Over the last fifteen years contributions of a number of authors to a variety of different
 fields in economics (Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975) have demonstrated the
 utility of the concept of rent-seeking both for making predictions and for drawing welfare
 judgments about a broad range of economic activities. The basic theory of rent-seeking
 is that the existence of an opportunity to obtain monopoly profits will attract resources
 into efforts to obtain monopolies, and the opportunity costs of these resources are social
 costs of monopoly as well. For example, suppose that a regulatory board meets every
 period and assigns the monopoly franchise for an industry to one of a competing number
 of entrants; the successful firm then earns ir dollars in monopoly profits for that period.
 The theory of rent-seeking suggests that firms will in the aggregate spend some fraction
 of ir dollars competing for the franchise by hiring lawyers, making presentations, etc. To
 the extent that these resources are misallocated, they represent a social cost of monopoly
 in addition to the normal deadweight loss.
 Posner (1975, p. 812) asserts that firms' expenditures will tend to be equal to ir:
 If ten firms are vying for a monopoly having a present value of $1 million, and each of them has an equal
 chance of obtaining it and is risk neutral, each will spend $100,000 (assuming constant costs) on trying to obtain
 the monopoly. Only one will succeed and his costs will be much smaller than the monopoly profits, but the
 total costs of obtaining the monopoly-counting losers' expenditures as well as winners' -will be the same as
 under certainty.
 The major purpose of this article is to show that this is a more sweeping statement than
 is warranted. Section 2 establishes the accounting identity that the firms' expected ag-
 gregate profits from the regulatory game are equal to the untransformed rents. Therefore,
 asking whether some rents are not transformed is equivalent to asking whether profits are
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 earned in the regulatory game. This article shows that there are at least two respects in
 which firms can be inframarginal and thus earn profits.
 First, different firms may face different fixed organization costs in forming an or-
 ganization and acquiring the necessary information to participate in the rent-seeking
 process. For example, a firm which has participated in other regulatory hearings con-
 cerning related technologies might experience almost no start-up costs. The extreme case
 of differential start-up costs is the case where n firms have no fixed costs and all other
 firms have infinite fixed costs. Section 3 shows for this case that firms' expectations are
 less than ir and approach ir as n goes to oo. Section 4 shows, more generally, that to the
 extent there are differential fixed costs, firms' expenditures will be less than ir. Firms with
 low fixed costs possess a scarce resource and these inframarginal firms earn rents.
 Second, firms may be inframarginal with respect to incumbency. Last year's franchise
 holder may well possess an advantage in this year's hearings because it has been able to
 establish a relationship with its regulators or to obtain extra information. Because potential
 entrants would perceive their chances of success as smaller, such an incumbency advantage
 might be expected to reduce entrants' expenditures in vying for the monopoly and thus
 reduce the social costs of monopoly. Posner (1975) correctly pointed out that an incum-
 bency advantage would also make the prize worth more and thus encourage expenditures.'
 The accounting identity of Section 2 sheds light on the net effect of these two factors by
 shifting the focus from expenditures to profits. Section 3 shows that the incumbent in
 such a game could well earn positive discounted profits, even if an infinite number of
 potential entrants with identical fixed costs exist. To the extent that this occurs, rents
 remain untransformed.
 One response to these two factors would be to push Posner's arguments one stage
 further back. The existence of an incumbent and/or differential fixed costs is exogenously
 given in this model. If firms competed to gain an initial incumbency advantage or firms
 spent money to lower their fixed costs in anticipation of the regulatory game, we might
 observe untransformed rents' being competed away at this earlier stage. Two points should
 be noted. First, many regulatory agencies are created to regulate firms already in existence.
 Second, the rent transformation argument requires that firms anticipate the size of rents
 being competed for. Williamson (1977) was the first to make this point. He argues that
 "whether the full-transformation or incomplete-transformation scenario is the more ac-
 curate, one depends in the final analysis on the computational powers of economic agents
 in relation to the degree of complexity and uncertainty with which they are expected to
 contend" (p. 721). Pushing the competition further and further back in time increases
 the uncertainty with which agents can estimate rents and thus makes them less likely to
 be competed away.
 Finally, in Section 5 it is shown that a unique degree of incumbency advantage
 maximizes firms' expenditures and furthermore that the maximizing degree of advantage
 varies in predictable ways with other observable characteristics of the game. This knowl-
 edge is not particularly interesting for the regulatory game where the degree of advantage
 is not necessarily changeable and goals such as obtaining information may be as important
 as minimizing expenditures. However, it is argued that the model can be interpreted as
 an R&D game where the successful innovator in one period has an advantage in the
 pursuit of subsequent innovations. The degree of this advantage can be affected by the
 government through changes in trade secrets legislation and disclosure requirements on
 government-sponsored research. The results of this section suggest a manner in which
 ' See Section 111.7. For example, on p. 824 Posner states: "Consider, for example, a market that is a natural
 monopoly.. . . [Social] costs can be reduced, however, by a rule limiting entry.. . . But the rule is not very
 satisfactory.. . . [T]he more efficient the rule at keeping out new entrants at low cost to the monopolist, the
 greater will be the expected value of having a natural monopoly-and, hence, the greater will be the resources
 that firms expend on trying to become the first to occupy a natural monopoly market."
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 government might want to offer differing degrees of incumbency advantage across differing
 industries, depending on the value of certain observable characteristics of the industries.
 2. The general case
 * We wish to model the idealized situation where n firms compete for the right to
 operate a monopoly franchise which generates profits. At the start of each period, a
 government agency assigns rights to the franchise for that period. Firms spend money
 attempting to influence this decision.
 Formally, we construct an n-person infinite period game. There are n states; let state
 j be the state where firm j is currently the monopolist. Let xij be the amount of money
 spent by firm i when state j occurs. The state space and firms' strategies are stationary.
 They are not dependent on t. A firm's probability of obtaining the franchise will clearly
 depend upon its and others' lobbying expenditures. It may also depend upon the state
 of the world. For example, a firm's chances of success may be greater if it is the monopolist,
 because it now has greater knowledge and expertise or because it has established a rela-
 tionship with its regulators. Let fij be the probability of firm i's succeeding in state j; fj
 is a function of (xlj, . . ., xnj). It must be true for every (xlj, . .. , xnj) that
 n
 Zfij = 1 for allj (1)
 i=l1
 fij 2 0 for all i, j. (2)
 Let wr be the profits that the successful firm earns in a period by operating the franchise.
 Firm i selects the strategy vector (x*, .. ., x*n). That is, firm i spends x*J if statej
 occurs. Let OAj be firm i's probability of success in state j with the given strategies:
 O)ij = fij(x*,j X X*, * * X X *l) (3)
 Let 0 be the matrix with (i, j) entry of Oti;
 0 = [0ij] (4)
 By (1) and (2) 0 is a stochastic matrix. The associated stochastic process is the one that
 determines which firm will be the monopolist for each period.
 Such a matrix always has a steady-state solution-a vector y = [-Yi, ., 'Yn]
 such that
 (i) y, ? 0 for all i (5)
 (i) Yji (6) i=l
 (iii) y - Qy. (7)
 The steady state may not be unique; as well, the stochastic process may actually converge
 to some sort of cycle. However, at a minimum, the average of the cycle which the stochastic
 process converges to equals one of the steady states. Therefore, one of the steady states
 describes the long-run average probability distribution which the stochastic process will
 exhibit. (Which steady state does this depends on the initial point.) Long-run expected
 values for this process are therefore calculated by using one of the steady-state distribu-
 tions. See Gantmacher (1960) for a complete discussion of these points.
 Before stating and proving the main theorem of this section, more notation needs
 to be introduced. Let 0i, be the probability of firm i 's becoming the monopolist in period
 t, given that firm j is currently the monopolist. That is, 0?- is the (i, j) entry of Ot. Let
 Rtij be the expected profit to firm i in period t, given that the world is currently in state
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.163 on Mon, 16 Oct 2017 21:32:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 394 / THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
 j. These returns can be defined recursively as follows:
 Rih = Opr - x*j (8)
 12
 Rij Z0`j R1k X t = 2, 3 .... (9)
 k= 1
 Assume that all firms calculate the value of the game by summing discounted expected
 profits with firm i using the discount rate ci. Let Vij be the value of the game to firm i
 in state j:
 oo
 Vij= Z c'Rtk. (10)
 1= 1
 Finally, let Sj be the surplus of i- over total firm expenditures which occurs in state j:
 n
 Sl
 We can now prove the accounting identity for this game. The long-run expected
 surplus that this game generates is a nonnegative weighted sum of the values { Vij}.
 Theore]n 1. Let y be a steady-state solution to 0. Then
 n 17 17
 Z jSj= Z Z zy(l - ci)Vi. (12)
 j=lI i=1 j=1
 Proof The value functions must all satisfy
 t7
 Vij = Rb. + Ci E0 kjVik. (13)
 k= 1
 Sum this over indices as required, using (7). Q.E.D.
 The value of the game to every player must always be nonnegative if we assume that the
 strategy of doing nothing at zero cost is available to each player. Therefore, the right-hand
 side of (12) is nonnegative and so is the left-hand side. As a result, the long-run expected
 surplus of ir over total expenditures is nonnegative.
 Note that Vij is the present discounted value to player i from being in state j. Therefore,
 Ii
 (1 - c1)Vij is the "annual value" of this multiyear value and (1 - ci)Vij represents the
 i=l1
 aggregate annual profits for the firms in state j. Equation (12) therefore states that the
 long-run expected surplus (left-hand side) equals the long-run expected annual aggregate
 profits (right-hand side). That is, expenditures fall short of ir to the extent that firms make
 positive expected profits.
 3. A special case: no fixed costs
 * The remainder of the article deals with a special case where the f ij functions are given
 a particular functional form. This section makes the additional assumption that fixed
 costs of entry into the game are zero for n + 1 firms and infinite for all others. Let f ij be
 given by
 fij(?X**, 0) = 0(14)
 and by
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 f ij(x * * . X n - X - I,iJ) tkj (15)
 3xjy + 2JXkj
 k*j
 for every (xlj, . . ., x,+?,j) # 0, where A is some real number greater than or equal to 1.
 Each firm's chance of obtaining the franchise is simply the proportion of total lobbying
 expenditures that it accounts for weighted by 1 if it is not currently the monopolist
 and by : if it is the current monopolist. For any fixed vector of expenditures
 (Xij, ..., Xn+? 1,) it is easy to see that f ij decreases in f for i * j and increases in A for
 i = j. Therefore, to the extent that : is greater than 1, the current monopolist has an
 advantage in regulatory hearings to determine the next franchise holder. All potential
 entrants receive equal treatment. Each firm faces the same return function if it becomes
 the monopolist. This is, therefore, in some sense the simplest specification of a case where
 the monopolist has an advantage.2 As well, assume that each firm uses the same discount
 rate, C.
 We shall use the Nash equilibrium concept.
 Definition. The strategy vectors {x l, ..., x*+ } are equilibrium strategies if for every
 i and j, x i satisfies
 Vi(Xi, ... , Xi*, ... .,x 1) = sup Vi1(x1, ..* ,Xi, * *, x 1). (16)
 xseR'++
 That is, x must maximize (Vil, . . ., Vin+ 1) given others' behavior. Note that the domain
 of xi is R'++1 (where R+ = [0, oo)). In particular, the firm always has the option of doing
 nothing at zero cost and zero return.
 A possible criticism of this definition is that it does not allow firms to consider
 nonstationary strategies. A nonstationary strategy for firm i would be an infinite vector
 of n-tuples (xl, x 2, * *), where x is the n-tuple representing firm i 's strategy at time t.
 Fortunately, an equilibrium in the game where firms are restricted to stationary strategies
 is also an equilibrium in the game where firms are allowed to choose nonstationary
 strategies. If firm i observes all the other firms' choosing a stationary strategy, it finds itself
 facing a stationary dynamic program and can do no better by using a nonstationary
 strategy than a stationary one. (See Denardo (1967) for proof of this.) Therefore, the
 equilibrium defined above is more robust than the formal definition indicates.
 Recall from (13) that the return functions are particularly simple-a firm's probability
 of winning is not affiected by which of the others is the monopolist so long as they all
 spend the same. Therefore, we might hope for a particularly simple sort of equilibrium
 to occur; each firm's strategy is one number, Xe, if it is an entrant and another number,
 Xm, if it is the monopolist. We shall call this a symmetric equilibrium.
 Definition. An equilibrium {x i* }I is a symmetric equilibrium if there exist two numbers
 Xe and x,n such that for every i and j
 (Xe, i#+j
 | X 1n i =j (17)
 The major result of this section is the constructive proof of the existence and uniqueness
 of such a symmetric equilibrium. Since each player has the same strategy and it only
 varies as he is the entrant or monopolist, it will be seen that all of the variables indexed
 2 It is possible to solve the game explicitly when each x,1 is weighted by some constant 3,Bi. However, it is
 not clear how to interpret this more general specification so the simpler model is presented.
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 by (i, j) will only assume two values. We shall employ the notational convenience of
 indexing them by "e" or "m" for the state of being the entrant or the monopolist, re-
 spectively.
 Theorem 2. The unique3 symmetric equilibrium for n E { 1, 2, 3, . . } is:
 Xe = b (18)
 n n- l\
 Xm = (n - )xeX (19)
 where
 a = c(2 - 1) + (I - c)32 (20)
 b = c + (l - c)f. (21)
 Other variables assume the following values (uniquely):
 Oe = On + 1 (22)
 ,3n + 1 -23
 Vel = 3+ (23)
 e (1 - c)(an2 + 2bn + 1) (24)
 Vtn = [(1 - C)(02 - (2/ - 1))n2 + 2(1 - c)(O - 1)n + ] Ve * (25)
 Proof: See the Appendix.
 The untransformed rents are equal to
 ir - nXe - Xm. (26)
 It is easy to show that nXe + Xm increases with the number of firms, n. As n goes to
 infinity, aggregate expenditures are
 2Cl- I2. (27)
 This number equals ir when A is 1, equals 0 when A goes to oo, and decreases for values
 of A in [ 1, oo]. Therefore, untransformed rents are always positive. They are smaller if
 there are more potential entrants. If the incumbent has no advantage, untransformed
 rents go to zero as n increases. However, to the extent that there is an incumbency
 advantage, a progressively higher floor is created for the size of untransformed rents which
 bounds them strictly away from zero.
 The duality between untransformed rents and firms' profits provides the intui-
 tion for these results. The accounting identity proven in Theorem 1 for this particular
 example is
 fr - nXe-Xm = (1 - C)(nVe + Vn). (28)
 That is, untransformed rents equal the annualized expected present discounted value of
 the n entrants and one incumbent from playing the game. As n increases, competition
 drives the aggregate values of the entrants, n Ve, to zero. However, to the extent the
 incumbent has an advantage, even an infinite number of potential entrants cannot reduce
 his discounted expected profits to zero.
 3 For the case c = 0 (when the world ends after the first period) the symmetric equilibrium is in fact the
 unique equilibrium. Therefore, although it has not been shown that the symmetric equilibrium is the unique
 equilibrium for the case of c 2 1, the solution is a generalization of the unique solution for the one-period case.
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 4. A special case with fixed costs
 * The sources of incomplete rent transformation. This subsection uses the same func-
 tional form for the f ij functions as Section 3, but relaxes the particular assumption about
 fixed costs made in Section 3. A firm with positive fixed start-up costs will participate in
 the hearings if and only if Ve exceeds its costs. Firms with progressively larger fixed costs
 will join the game and thereby reduce Ve until entry is no longer profitable. Formally,
 assume that there are N possible participants in the game, where N can be oo. Index
 members of the set by i in such a way that firms with lower fixed costs have lower index
 numbers. Let F(i) be firm i's fixed costs. Then n* is an equilibrium number of nonin-
 cumbent firms (for a total of n* + 1 firms) if two conditions are satisfied. First, every
 firm must make nonnegative profits as a nonincumbent (or there must be no nonincum-
 bent players):
 n* = 0 or F(n* + 1) < Ve(n*). (29)
 Second, any other firm which contemplated entering the game would make negative
 profits (or all N - 1 firms are nonincumbent players):
 n* = N- 1 or F(n* + 2) > Ve(n* + 1). (30)
 Since Ve is decreasing in n, continuous, and zero in the limit and since F is nondecreasing,
 it is easy to see that an equilibrium number of nonincumbent players always exists and
 is unique.
 With nonzero fixed costs, annualized fixed costs now need to be included in the rent
 transformation equation. If there are n nonincumbent firms, the surplus of r over ex-
 penditures is
 n+1
 r - nxe(n) - x,n(n) -(1-c) E F(i), (31)
 i=l1
 which, by the accounting identity of (26) is equal to
 n+1
 (1 - c)[nVe(n) + V,J(n) - F(i)]. (32)
 i=l1
 Expression (32) can be divided into two terms as follows:
 n+1
 (1 - c)[Z (Ve(n) - F(i))] + (1 - c)[ V,J(n) - Ve(n)]. (33)
 i=l1
 The first term of (33) represents annualized rents accruing to firms which are infra-
 marginal with respect to fixed costs. As in any situation generating inframarginal rents,
 smaller numbers of firms with low fixed costs will increase the amount of inframarginal
 rent earned by them.
 The second term of (33) represents the annualized rents accruing to the incumbent
 because of his incumbency advantage. From Section 3, V,,(n) - Ve(n) is always greater
 than or equal to lim Vm(n)4 which is positive. In fact, lim Vm(n) can be made arbitrarily
 n-oo n-oo
 close to lr/(1 - c) by increasing A.
 To see this it is sufficient to show that (a/an)[( V,n(n) - Ve(n))] < 0. From Theorem 2,
 - (V,n(n) - Ve(n)) - (an2 + 2bn + 1)2 '
 which can be shown to be negative.
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 O Comparative statics of fixed cost. In this subsection the effect of an increase in all
 firms' fixed costs is considered. Since the equilibrium number of players is a nonincreasing
 function of the level of fixed costs, the results of Section 3 imply that the surplus of ir
 over nXe + Xm is a nondecreasing function of the level of fixed costs. As fixed costs rise,
 the smaller number of players results in less rent transformation into annual expenditures.
 Although lowering fixed costs increases the amount of ir eaten up by annual expen-
 ditures, this does not fully describe the transformation process. Fixed expenditures should
 also be considered as rent transformation, if they are actually made. When fixed orga-
 nizational costs suddenly drop for an existing regulatory process, existing firms which
 joined the regulatory game previously cannot retroactively reduce their fixed expenditures.
 The only effect will be to induce marginal firms to enter the game. Therefore, aggregate
 expenditures on fixed costs will rise along with expenditures on annual costs, and the
 surplus of ir over total expenditures will fall. When fixed organizational costs suddenly
 rise for an existing regulatory process, existing firms will not have to pay more fixed costs
 or be induced to leave the game. Obviously no new firms will be induced to enter, and,
 as a consequence, expenditures on fixed costs will not change. Therefore, the surplus of
 ir over total expenditures will rise.
 Finally, we need to compare two regulatory processes which have always had different
 fixed costs of entry but are similar in other respects. In this case, the decrease in fixed
 costs and increase in annual expenditures work in opposite directions, and no unambig-
 uous prediction concerning the effects on the amount of rent transformation is possible.
 Two examples illustrate this. First, consider a case where n + 1 firms have zero fixed
 costs, and the remainder of the firms have infinite fixed costs. Lowering fixed costs cor-
 responds to making n larger. In this case firms' profits are n Ve(n) + V,f(n). This sum
 decreases in n. Therefore, as fixed costs drop (rise) the amount of rent transformation
 increases (decreases). Second, consider a case where fixed costs fall only for inframarginal
 firms, but remain unchanged for the marginal firm and extramarginal firms. It is clear
 that the equilibrium number of firms, Ve, and Vm are not affected. Therefore, total profits
 of all firms rise, and the amount of rent transformation increases.
 In summary, when comparing two existing regulatory processes with different fixed
 costs, the process with lower fixed costs will have more players and higher annual ex-
 penditures. However, if costs are calculated by including annualized fixed costs, either
 process might exhibit larger expenditures and thus more rent transformation.
 5. Comparative statics of 85
 * Corollary 1 summarizes the effects of / on aggregate expenditures.
 Corollary 1. There exists a function,
 ,y: {1, 2, 3,..., AT-1 } X [0, 1] [1, oo],
 such that
 ao
 (i) /3 < y(n, c) == (flXe + x,n) > 0
 = 3y(l, c)- 3(lXe + Xpn)0= (27)
 /3> y(n, c) =- a (nxe + xrn) < 0
 a/3
 For simplicity of presentation, the case where n + 1 firms have zero fixed costs and all others have
 infinite fixed costs is formally considered. To the extent that reducing: f induces entry, reducing: f might be
 generally more desirable. The qualitative propositions of this analysis, however, are unchanged.
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 (ii) < 0 (28)
 an
 (iii) ay > . (29) ac
 Proof. From Theorem 2 we can write
 a -2n4(1 - C)f2 + 2n3(1 - c)f + 2n3 + cn2
 (goXe + Xm) = (an2 + 2bn + 1)2 (30)
 From this, it follows that if we define
 5(0, n) On 2(O _ 1) +: On -n (31) O3n2(/3 l )+fn-nI
 then
 (i) c 5 6 according as a(e + X,n) o (32)
 (ii) for every (3, n) E (1, oo) X {1, 2, 3* }, 0 c 5(3, n) < 1, (33)
 (iii) 'a > O, (95 > O. (34)
 Define y implicitly by
 c = 6(,y(c, n), n). Q.E.D. (35)
 The effect of d on aggregate expenditures can be conceptually separated into a short-
 run and long-run effect. In the short run increasing the incumbent's advantage increases
 the incumbent's chances of winning and reduces the attractiveness of expenditures for
 everyone. However, in the longer run the prize of winning is more attractive, because the
 incumbent finds it easier to maintain his position; this should increase firms' expenditures.
 Result (i) is that the long-run effect dominates for small values of A, but eventually
 aggregate expenditures begin to fall with 3.
 Result (ii) says that increasing the number of players in the game reduces the relative
 influence of the long-run effect. The reasons for this are not clear. A priori reasoning
 suggests any result could be possible. Result (iii) is more intuitive; as all firms discount
 the future more heavily, the influence of the short-run effect becomes larger.
 6. Applications
 * A theory of regulation which assumes that no rents are transformed would suggest
 that the regulator be careful to set 7r as low as possible to minimize deadweight loss in
 the regulated market. A theory which takes rent transformation into account, but which
 assumes that all of the firms' expenditures have no social value, simply adds another
 reason for setting 7r close to zero. However, at least some of the expenditures by firms
 may be socially useful. For example, firms may spend money on designing better products
 or generating useful information for the regulatory agency in the process of competing
 with one another. This view provides a rationale for choosing 7r to be positive. The
 regulator is essentially funding firms' expenditures from participating in the regulatory
 process through choosing Xr to be greater than zero.
 In this model, the regulator views its choice of 7r and its choices of rules and procedures
 which affect d and the level of fixed costs as one coordinated plan to maximize social
 surplus.6 The aggregate level of expenditures can be directly affected by choosing 7r.
 Therefore, the goals of the regulator in choosing d and the level of fixed costs should be
 6 Of course, various equity considerations are also likely to be important.
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 to (i) increase the fraction of rents transformed and (ii) alter the patterns of expenditures
 in ways which increase their social usefulness. The rationale for the first goal is that, for
 a given level of aggregate expenditures, increases in the fraction of 7r transformed allow
 7r to be chosen smaller and thus deadweight loss in the regulated market to be reduced.
 The first goal suggests that a regulatory process should be designed so that the as-
 signment procedure is as competitive as possible; as many potential entrants as possible
 should be encouraged to participate and, especially if there are many entrants, the in-
 cumbency advantage should be as low as possible. The second goal, however, may conflict
 with the first. For example, if there are increasing returns to scale in preparing a well-
 planned service or a well-designed product, increasing the fixed costs of at least some
 potential entrants (possibly by simply arbitrarily excluding all but a small number) could
 alter the pattern of expenditures in a desirable manner. Although aggregate expenses
 would fall, average expenses per firm would rise.
 This article can also be interpreted as modeling certain aspects of the R&D process.
 At the beginning of each period, firms each decide how much money to spend on R&D
 for that period. A firm's probability of discovering a profitable new product increases as
 its expenditures increase and decreases as its competitor's expenditures increase. The
 expected revenues of the firm therefore depend on the expenditures of that firm relative
 to all other firms. Furthermore, success in the past period gives a firm a head start in this
 period's R&D. The size of 3 measures the size of this advantage.
 Government has some control over the size of 3 in an industry. Trade secrets leg-
 islation and disclosure rules for government-funded research clearly affect 3. By having
 more stringently enforced trade secrets legislation or by not requiring firms operating
 under government contracts to make their research public, the government grants the
 winning firm an increased advantage relative to its opponents in the next round. Note
 that the role of trade secrets legislation is distinct from any role the government may play
 relating to the appropriability of an invention. (Firms cannot copy an invention if some
 aspect of it is secret.) In the model, this second effect simply amounts to ensuring that
 the winning firm actually receives 7r. The first effect of increasing d is separate.
 Corollary 1 shows that a unique level of:3 exists which maximizes R&D expenditures.
 Furthermore, it increases with the discount rate and decreases with the number of firms.
 Therefore, if the government wanted to use trade secrets legislation as a spur to innovative
 activity,7 it might choose different levels of enforcement in different types of industries.
 For example, trade secrets legislation may be more important in smaller industries as an
 incentive for innovative activity. As regards the discount rate, if we hold the time discount
 rate over continuous time constant and increase the rate of innovative activity, we shorten
 the length of each period and thus increase the discount rate in our discrete model.
 Therefore, this model suggests that industries characterized by rapid innovative activity
 need stricter trade secrets legislation and fewer disclosure requirements on government-
 sponsored research to induce greater R&D effort than industries characterized by a slower
 pace of innovative activity.
 Appendix
 Proof of theorem 2
 * Only an outline of the proof is given here. A complete proof appears in Roger-
 son (1981).
 7 Of course, government would not necessarily desire to stimulate R&D effort in all industries. To evaluate
 whether increased R&D expenditures would be welfare improving and then to determine an optimal value for
 f would require explicit modeling of the R&D production function so that such factors as potential duplication
 of effort and economies of scale could be taken into account. See Scherer (1980) for a discussion of market
 structure and R&D and for references to other sources. This article simply identifies how government might
 use trade secrets legislation as a spur to innovative activity.
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 The standard approach for calculating a symmetric Nash equilibrium is followed.
 First we characterize firm i's optimal strategy, given fixed strategies of the other firms.
 Then we solve for a strategy vector of the required form such that firm i will choose it,
 given that other firms have chosen it.
 The functional equation of dynamic programming (Denardo, 1967) is used to char-
 acterize firm i 's optimal choice. Let the other firms' choices be given by {x3 }joj. Suppose
 that firm i chooses xij in state j and that yj is the present discounted value to firm i, given
 it is in state j. Firm i 's choice of strategy determines the transition probabilities. We shall
 write 0ij(xij) to show this dependence. The immediate expected payoff to firm i is the
 expected return from winning minus its expenditure:
 1ij(Xij)-Xij * (A 1)
 As well, firm i will find itself in state k with probability 6ij(xij) next period. The expected
 present discounted value of this is
 ii+1
 (1 - c) E Okj(Xij)Yk (A2)
 k= I
 Let gij(xi7, ,. . . , yn+l) denote the total present discounted value of state j to firm i, which
 is the sum of these two terms. The functional equation of dynamic programming says
 that x i is an optimal strategy for firm i with associated values (y i, . *. , Y n) if and only
 if for every j= 1, .. .,n+ 1,
 (i) X maximizes gij(xi, vj, ... , Y*+') over x i* E [0, ce]
 and
 (ii) yv* = gij(x, Y 1, * n+l.).
 Part (i) states that x * must maximize gij, since gij determines the value of state j to firm
 i. However, y)* is supposed to be this value. Therefore, (ii) must also hold.
 It is now straightforward (at least conceptually, if not algebraically) to write out
 explicitly the gij's and solve for a symmetric equilibrium.
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